

## NSC BRIEFING

26 February 1958

## INDONESIA

- I. Bombings and blockading of dissident strongholds in Sumatra and North Celebes represents first effort by Djakarta to suppress dissidents as quickly as possible by all available means.
  - A. Attacks have knocked out rebel radios in Padang and Bukittinggi, both in Central Sumatra, and in Manado, North Celebes.
  - B. Limited naval blockade has had some effect in obstructing rebel barter trade.
  - C. Central government ground troops have not yet been used.
- II. Decision to use force undoubtedly made by Sukarno who returned 18 Feb and announced intention to crush rebellion 21 February.
  - A. Cabinet on 20 February gave Sukarno full power to deal with situation and to use force if necessary.
  - B. Sukarno unlikely to make any political or economic concessions to dissidents until they are defeated or surrender.
  - C. Djuanda has stated privately that he fears struggle will be prolonged and perhaps inconclusive, but backs Sukarno and will not resign.
- III. Sukarno, is reported relying on his political strength in Java to sanction his moves, and is whipping up support for military campaign in holy name of nationalism.
  - A. He has gained dominance over Javanese elements of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and National Party (PNI) and is working on Javanese Masjumi.

Army review(s) completed.

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/10/21 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000900060029-1

B. Several commanders in other areas have reiterated their loyalty to Djakarta; these include commanders in Borneo, South Celebes, the Lesser Sundas, the Moluccas, and North Sumatra.

1. Some of their statements have been rather vague but from Djakarta's point of view, at least they are not supporting rebels.

25X1

V. Rebels so far have not received support from other areas in Sumatra, particularly Atjeh in north, and South Sumatra, on which they had counted.

A. However, Barlian in South Sumatra has made it clear that he will not permit govt troops to move through his command against the rebels.

B. The Atjehnese as yet have made no move, but Djakarta fears they may attack Medan, which is pro-Djakarta, if the latter initiates ground operations against Central Sumatra.

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/10/21 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000900060029-1

Approved For Release 2003/10/21 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000900060029-1

- VI. Makassar Straits incident probably will raise more Sukarno wrath.**
- A. On 20 February Dutch destroyer claimed it was fired on by former Dutch merchant vessel now under Indonesian captain and crew. Dutch boarded and disarmed merchantmen, and took ship to Dutch New Guinea.**
- B. Though silent so far, Indonesians probably will cite this incident as well as Sumatran revolt as evidence of Western interference in Indonesian affairs.**

NSC BRIEFING

26 February 1958

## BACKGROUND ON INDONESIA

Estimated orientation of battalions in Sumatra, based on G-2 data.

- I. Atjeh Military District--Of four infantry battalions, three are estimated to be sympathetic to the dissidents, and one to be pro-Djakarta.
- II. North Sumatra Military District--Of eight infantry battalions, five are estimated to be sympathetic to the dissidents, one to be pro-dissident, one to be pro-Djakarta, and one neutral. The artillery battalion and the cavalry battalion are believed neutral.
- III. Central Sumatra Military District--All four infantry battalions are pro-dissident.
- IV. South Sumatra Military District--Of twelve infantry battalions, eight are estimated to be sympathetic to the dissidents, three to be neutral, and one to be pro-Djakarta. The cavalry battalion is estimated to be sympathetic to the dissidents.

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/10/21 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000900060029-1

Approved For Release 2003/10/21 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000900060029-1